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When some five years after the Rus-
sian Revolution an attempt was being 
made at a conference at the Hague to 
settle some of the issues between the 
Soviets and the Western European coun-
tries, and arbitration was suggested, 
Litvinov, the Soviet representative, was 
reported to have said: 
Commander Hilton Young had 
asked whether it would be impos-
sible to find a single impartial 
judge in the whole world. It was 
necessary to face the fact that 
there was not one world but 
two-a Soviet world and a non-
Soviet world. Because there was 
no third world to arbitrate, he 
anticipated difficulties ... The 
division he had mentioned ex-
isted, and with it existed a bias 
and a hatred, for which the Rus-
sian Government must decline the 
responsibility. Only an angel 
could be unbiased in judging Rus-
sian affairs ... 
This statement reflects one aspect of 
Communist ideology which has colored 
the Sovjet attitude toward international 
law-the concept of two worlds between 
which there is hatred-the Soviet and 
the non-Soviet. In the Soviet Union, 
ideology has been closely related to 
policy. Let us look at the Soviet ide-
ology and its implications for intern a-
tionallaw. 
The Communists profess to interpret 
history in terms of the class struggle. On 
one side are the exploiters, the capital-
ists, those who own the means of 
production. On the other side are the 
toIlers, the proletariat, those through 
whose labor the exploiters make profits 
for themselves. These two classes are 
antagonistic in their interests, and, con-
sequently, hostile to each other. In their 
struggle, no holds are barred. In the 
capitalist states, government, law, re-
ligion and morality are all weapons by 
which the capitalists protect their 
property interests and keep the workers 
in subjection. But, the Communists say, 
historical development inexorably 
dooms capitalism. Beset by its own 
inner contradictions, capitalism is 
bound to be overthrown by the workers 
in a not too distant future. The Russian 
Revolution, in which the workers for 
the first time in history succeeded in 
overthrowing capitalistic rule, marks the 
beginning of the end. When the workers 
are finally victorious everywhere, they 
will completely destroy the capitalist 
system of government, law and 
morality. Eventually there will be a 
world commonwealth of labor in which 
government and law will become un-
necessary and fade away, since there 
will no longer be any antagonistic 
classes struggling with each other. But 
before this comes to pass, there is 
bound to be a period of transition, a 
period of struggle, since capitalism will 
not willingly give way to Communism. 
During this period, the workers, wher-
ever they are victorious, as in Russia, 
will set up a dictatorship of the prole-
tariat to crush capitalist resistance; they 
will seize and use the machinery of 
government in their own interests. 
In its struggle against capitalism, the 
proletariat must not be handicapped by 
moral scruples. Lenin said that at this 
stage of history morality "is completely 
subordinated to the interests of the class 
struggle of the proletariat." Recent 
Soviet writings leave little doubt that 
the advancement of Communism still 
remains the supreme criterion of 
morality in Soviet ideology. Hatred of 
the class enemy-of capitalists as a 
class-continues to be regarded as one of 
the components of Soviet morality. 
Law is regarded by the Communists 
as an instrument by which the ruling 
class imposes its will on the community. 
Vyshinsky, for instance, has defined law 
as "the sum total of rules of conduct 
expressing the will of the ruling class" 
which are enforced "in order to protect, 
consolidate and develop such social rela-
tions and institutions as are advan-
tageous and agreeable to the ruling 
class." In a United Nations debate in 
1948, he said that law is nothing but an 
instrument of policy; that law and 
policy cannot be contrasted. 
The law of a state ruled by the 
capitalists is bound to be quite different 
from the law of a state such as the 
Soviet Union, in which the will of the 
workers prevails. One is an instrument 
of capitalist policy; the other an instru-
ment of the anti-capitalist policy of the 
working class. The Communists profess 
to find support for their conception of 
law in the actual practices of capitalist 
governments; they claim that law is 
cynically manipulated by capitalists to 
suit their own purposes. 
At this point, I should admit that my 
presentation of Communist philosophy 
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has been sketchy and oversimplified. I 
think, however, that I have presented 
enough of the basic ideas to draw the 
necessary implications. Let us look at 
the matter from the standpoint of a 
Communist who takes his ideology seri-
ously. 
First, there is no room for any 
genuine and lasting community of inter-
est between the Communist and the 
non-Communist worlds, since there is 
bound to be implacable hostility be-
tween them. This does not mean, of 
course, that there will be open warfare 
all the time; but the periods of relaxa-
tion are merely uneasy truces. Neither 
side can truly reconcile itself to the 
continuing successful existence of the 
other. If a genuine community interest 
among nations is to be regarded as one 
of the foundations of international law, 
this foundation would seem to be lack-
ing in the relations between the Com-
munist and the non-Communist states. 
Second, the period of transition-
that is, the period of coexistence of the 
Communist and non-Communist worlds 
-is bound to be a limited one. It will 
end in a not too distant future with the 
complete triumph of Communism. This 
means that Communists have little rea-
son to attach much value to the long-
range advantages of the observance of 
international law in good faith. If expec-
tations of stability and permanence are 
one of the foundations of international 
law, this foundation, too, would seem 
to be lacking in the relations between 
the Communist and the non-Communist 
worlds. 
Third, since Communists reject capi-
talist morality and are told that the 
advancement of Communism is the 
supreme moral imperative, morality in 
the traditional sense plays little or no 
part in Communist ideology as a basis 
for the observance of international law. 
Furthermore, law is for the Commu-
nists nothing but an instrument of the 
policy of the ruling class. In its modern 
form, international law has grown up 
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among capitalist states; it must, there-
fore, be an instrument of capitalist 
policies. Why should a state controlled 
by a class hostile to capitalism have 
anything to do with it? Indeed, if law 
always expresses the will of a ruling 
class and is enforced by it in its own 
interest, how can there be any law in 
the relations between states ruled by 
different and mutually hostile classes? 
The will of which of these classes would 
it express? Or, is each of the classes to 
apply international law only to the 
extent and in the way that suits its own 
interests and policies? 
It is clear that the Communist con-
ception of law as an instrument of 
policy makes for a highly practical and 
flexible approach. Rules of law are not 
absolutes that must be oheyed regard-
less of consequences; they cannot con-
trol policy; they are merely the means 
of producing desired results and should 
be interpreted and applied accordingly. 
It might be expected that since inter-
national law was difficult to fit into 
Communist ideology it would be de-
clared nonexistent, unreal. Far from it. 
Soviet writers, with official blessing, 
unanimously uphold the reality of inter-
national law. They refer to it as an 
attribute of culture and civilization, and 
as an essential condition of modern 
international relations. Those in the 
West who' deny or doubt the reality of 
international law are attacked as 
nihilists. Soviet leaders from time to 
time call for more study of international 
law. International law is often invoked 
in official Soviet documents and 
speeches. In short, the Soviets profess to 
recognize international law and even to 
lay stress on it. The philosophical diffi-
culties of fitting international law into 
the Communist scheme of things have 
not heen completely resolved; they still 
trouble Soviet writers; but they are not 
permitted to stand in the way of pro-
fessed acceptance of international law 
by the Soviet State. 
This acceptance, however, is not 
complete. For example, Kojevnikov, a 
leading Soviet jurist who is now the 
Soviet judge on the International Court 
of} ustice, wrote in 1948: 
Those institutions in interna· 
tional law which can facilitate the 
execution of the stated tasks of 
the USSR are recognized and 
applied by the USSR, and those 
institutions which conflict in any 
manner with these purposes are 
rejected by the USSR. 
Yet Soviet writers, generally speaking, 
are cold to the idea that there are two 
completely distinct bodies of interna-
tional law, one Soviet and the other 
capitalist. In this sense, there is no 
special Soviet international law. What it 
boils down to is that the Soviets accept 
international law to the extent that it 
suits their purposes. Indeed, the Soviet 
leaders are in a somewhat difficult 
position. On the one hand, they want to 
use international law to serve their own 
purposes. For this reason, they must 
admit its reality and even try to build it 
up. On the other hand, they do not 
want international law to be used 
against them. The' Soviet position is, 
therefore, ambiguous and highly 
flexible. Vyshinsky has defined interna-
tional law as "the sum total of the 
norms regulating relations between 
states in the process of their struggle 
and cooperation, expressing the will of 
the ruling classes of these states and 
secured by coercion exercised by states 
individually or collectively." Note that 
"struggle" is put ahead of "coopera-
ti· " on. 
What are the Soviet needs served hy 
international law? Let us take our cue 
from Vyshinsky's reference to struggle 
and cooperation-in that order. 
After a very brief initial period of 
confident expectation that the workers 
of the rest of the world would follow 
the Russian example and put an end to 
capitalism right away, the Soviet leaders 
realized that the Soviet and the non-
Soviet worlds would coexist for some 
time to come. The Soviet State found 
itself in what they call "the capitalist 
encirclement. " The capitalist world was, 
for the time being, stronger than the 
Soviet world. There was little or no 
open warfare between the two-except 
in part for World War II-but there was 
a continuing struggle, a struggle for the 
minds of men, and an expectation of 
greater struggles to come. The Soviet 
world, being the weaker of the two, 
needed time-time to strengthen itself 
and to weaken the opposition. Under 
these conditions, the Soviet leaders 
turned to international law. Weak as it 
was, it had enough appeal, enough 
power to influence people, to be a 
useful instrument of Soviet policy. 
First and foremost in the minds of 
the Soviet leaders was the danger of 
intervention from abroad against the 
weak Soviet State. Such intervention, in 
fact, did take place in the first few years 
after the Revolution when civil war still 
raged in Russia. Although the Soviet 
regime survived, any repetition might be 
disastrous. Moreover, the Soviet politi-
eal and economie system was so dif-
ferent from the capitalist system that 
the Soviet leaders saw danger in any 
tendency for the capitalist states to have 
a voice in how the Soviet system should 
be run. Naturally enough, the Soviets 
appealed to the time-honored prineiples 
of sovereignty, nonintervention and 
equality of states. These principles 
would help them run their own country 
wi thout outside interference, and, 
despite their weakness, hold themselves 
equal to any other state in the world. 
The Soviets also emphasized their oppo-
sition to forcible annexation of foreign 
territory. 
The principles of sovereignty and 
nonintervention continue to serve the 
purposes of the Soviet policy to this 
day. For example, when the United 
States recently brought up for diseus-
sion the problem of the Soviet satellites 
in Europe, the Russians said that such 
discussion would amount to inter-
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vention in the affairs of sovereign states. 
The principle of nonintervention has 
been appealed to again and again-for 
example, during the Spanish Civil War, 
to mobilize public opinion against the 
German and Italian help to Franco; and, 
more recently, in denunciations of the 
help given by the United States to the 
foes of Communism in China, Korea, 
Guatemala and other countries. 
The need of the Soviet leaders to 
protect themselves against capitalist 
interference is also reflected in various 
corollaries of the principle of sover-
eignty. For example, the Soviets like to 
stress treaties rather than eustom as the 
chief source of international law. A 
treaty is not binding on them unless 
they choose to ratify or otherwise 
accept it, while a custom-which may 
have been formed long before the Rus-
sian Revolution-might be held binding 
on the Soviet Union even if it did not 
manifest its acceptance. Similarly, the 
Soviets take a generally negative atti-
tude toward any device whereby any 
decision binding on them could be made 
without their specific consent. They 
oppose all proposals to give any interna-
tional organization the power to make 
decisions on any matter of importance 
by a majority vote, unless they retain a 
veto power, as in the United Nations 
Security Council. As suggested by the 
quotation from Litvinov, with which I 
opened my talk, the Soviets are skepti-
cal of the value of arbitration in the 
settlement of their disputes with other 
states, although in all fairness it must be 
pointed out that they offered to arbi-
trate two disputes with the British in 
1923 and 1924, and that the offer was 
ignored. Although the Soviet Union is a 
party to the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, and a Soviet national is 
one of the judges, the Soviets have not 
agreed to accept the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court under Article 36 of 
the Statute and have invariably declined 
all offers to submit their disputes with 
other countries to the Court. In fact, 
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they take pains to attach to multilateral 
treaties to which they are parties reser-
vations against the submission of dis-
putes arising under those treaties to the 
International Court. The specific rea-
sons for this attitude are not hard to 
find. True to their conception of law, 
the Soviets do not regard the Court as 
standing above politics, but rather as a 
body in which the interests of the 
capitalist states-from which most of 
the judges come-are bound to prevail. 
Soviet writers, in fact, do not hesitate to 
impute political motives to the judges, 
and often speak of an Anglo-American 
majority on the Court. In short, the 
Soviets are generally not willing to 
submit themselves to majority or third-
party decisions lest such decisions be 
used by the capitalists to the detriment 
of the Soviet State. 
Basically, for the same reason, the 
Soviets oppose proposals to give to 
individuals any effective rights in inter-
national law. Soviet writers, in fact, 
refuse to recognize individuals as sub-
jects of international law. If individuals 
had such standing, the capitalist states 
would have a pretext for interfering 
with the control which the Soviet 
leaders exercise over their own people. 
The Soviets like to exercise their 
territorial sovereignty with as few re-
strictions as possible. They deny, for 
instance, that foreign warships have a 
right of innocent passage through terri-
torial waters-a point still unsettled in 
the West-and refuse to enter into any 
general agreements permitting foreign 
aircraft to fly over Soviet territory. 
Another international law principle 
which the Soviets have stressed as a 
means of self-protection is the principle 
of nonaggression. Before World War II, 
the Soviet Union negotiated a number 
of treaties with neighboring states de-
fining and forbidding aggression. In the 
League of Nations, the Soviet represen-
tatives were loud in their denunciations 
of the aggressions committed by the 
Japanese, the Italians, and the Germans, 
and in the protestations of the peaceful 
intentions of the Soviet Union. This 
policy produced considerable goodwill 
for the Soviets in the democratic coun-
tries at that time. Since World War II, 
the Soviets have participated in the 
trials of the major German and Japanese 
war criminals, and have been recently 
insisting on the adoption by the United 
Nations of a definition of aggression. 
The interest of the Soviet leaders in 
the protective function of international 
law is also reflected in the laws of war. 
Two distinctive Soviet positions may be 
mentioned here: (1) the Soviet espousal 
of the lawfulness of guerrilla warfare 
behind the lines, and (2) the denuncia-
tion of weapons of mass destruction 
such as atom bombs and germ warfare. 
So far as guerrilla warfare is concerned, 
the Soviets appear to be conscious of its 
usefulness in case of a foreign invasion 
of the Soviet Union, which was in fact 
demonstrated in World War II, as well as 
in civil wars and anticolonial revolts in 
other countries. We all know the success 
with which the Communists have used 
guerrillas in China, Vietnam, and other 
places. The Soviet writers maintain that 
guerrillas are lawful belligerents, 
apparently drawing the conclusion that 
they are entitled to be treated as 
prisoners of war. The Soviet denuncia-
tions of the weapons of mass destruc-
tion may be attributed in part to con-
sciousness of the fact that at this time 
the use of such weapons would not be 
to the advantage of the Soviet Union 
and its allies, but they also serve an 
important propaganda purpose. These 
denunciations appeal powerfully to the 
natural revulsion of people everywhere 
against such horrible weapons as the 
H-bombs and disease germs, and, par-
ticularly, to the weaker or more ex-
posed countries. 
This brings me to another point. The 
Soviets use the slogans of international 
law only to help prevent measures 
which threaten their own security or 
freedom from outside interference. 
They use them to stir up resentment 
against their opponents and to attract 
support. We all recall the great propa-
ganda campaign against the alleged 
American resort to bacteriological war-
fare in Korea. The principles of sover-
eignty, nonintervention and equality of 
states have been constantly invoked by 
Soviet spokesmen and propagandists in 
their attacks against the United States. 
For example, the Marshall Plan, NATO, 
and American bases abroad have all 
been denounced as violations of the 
principles of sovereignty and equality, 
and as devices through which the United 
States interferes in the affairs of other 
states. Furthermore, Soviet writers and 
spokesmen invoke the principle of self-
determination as if it were an accepted 
principle of international law to stir up 
colonial and minority peoples against 
their rulers-and, in so doing, undoubt-
edly gain the sympathy of many such 
peoples. The laws of war are appealed to 
in denunciations of alleged atrocities by 
troops fighting against the Communists, 
as in Korea. The use of international law 
slogans as a psychological weapon be-
came particularly intense at the height 
of the cold war, during the conflict in 
Korea. Since the death of Stalin and the 
end of the Korean conflict the tone of 
Soviet propaganda has moderated, but 
international law is still drawn upon 
heavily. 
You may ask whether the espousal 
by the Soviets of such principles as 
sovereign ty, nonin terven tion, nonaggres-
sion and self-determination does not 
hamper the Soviets themselves in the 
achievement of their aims. But it is clear 
that the Soviets, who regard interna-
tional law as an instrument of policy 
and who recognize it because it suits 
their purposes, would not let it stand in 
the way of achievement of important 
policy aims. Soviet officials, it is true, 
never openly deny that international 
law exists or that it is binding on the 
Soviet Union. There are several ways, 
however, of preventing international law 
81 
from interfering with Soviet policy. One 
way, as I have already indicated, is to 
reject explicitly certain of the rules as 
unacceptable to the Soviet State and to 
insist on certain new rules. There are 
other, and probably more effective, 
ways. Many of the rules of international 
law are vague and uncertain, leaving 
much room for interpretation. Not in-
frequently there are contradictory 
precedents and authorities to choose 
from. As Professor Hazard says, "Soviet 
authors and statesmen pick and choose 
among the precedents to meet their 
needs, and they do so quite openly." 
The Soviet approach to international 
law, it must be repea!:ed, is very flexible. 
Kojevnikov, in his 1948 book, empha-
sizes that international law must not be 
interpreted in an "abstract dogmatic" 
fashion. In fact, the principles the 
Soviets profess to espouse do not deter 
them from pursuing policies in apparent 
conflict with these principles. The prin-
ciple of nonintervention, for example, 
has not prevented the Soviets from 
giving aid to subversive movements and 
Communist guerrillas abroad. Or, take 
the matter of nonaggression. As I have 
already pointed out, the Soviets profess 
to be unalterably opposed to aggression; 
they make nonaggression pacts; they are 
also said to oppose annexations and to 
favor self-determination. When the time 
came, however, this did not stop them 
from taking aggressive action against 
their neighbors, such as Poland, the 
Baltic States and Finland, with all of 
whom they had nonaggression pacts. 
The principle of nonaggression, 
furthermore, should be compared with 
the definition of just and unjust wars 
laid down in 1938 by Stalin himself and 
faithfully repeated by Soviet writers. 
Listen carefully to this definition: "Just 
wars-wars that are not wars of con-
quest but wars of liberation, waged to 
defend the people from foreign attack 
and from attempts to enslave them, or 
to liberate the people from capitalist 
slavery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies 
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and dependent countries from the yoke 
of imperialism, and Unjust wars-wars 
of conquest, waged to conquer and 
enslave foreign countries and foreign 
nations. » It is hardly open to doubt that 
this Stalinist doctrine of just war will be 
used to justify any war the Soviet 
leaders choose to wage. Furthermore, 
there are indications in Soviet literature 
that only those who are fighting a 
so-called just war will be regarded as 
entitled to the full benefits of the laws 
of war .. For instance, guerrilla warfare 
seems to be regarded as lawful only 
when waged as part of a just war. This is 
an important point to remember. In 
fact, the doctrine of just war may be the 
key to the full understanding of the 
Soviet conception of international law. 
It takes us back to the Communist 
conception of morality. Only he who 
wages a just war, or a just struggle, has 
any rights. And the Communists regard 
their struggle against capitalism-
whether or not it takes the form of 
open war-as just. Therefore, anything 
goes in the struggle against capitalism. 
Soviet spokesmen and writers never 
tire of proclaiming that the Soviet 
Union faithfully observes all treaties 
concluded by it on a basis of freedom, 
equality .and reciprocity. That the 
Soviets do attach some importance to 
the observance of treaties would seem 
to be indicated by the fact that they 
frequently take pains to protect legally 
their freedom of action on particular 
points by making express reservations. 
In other words, the Soviet leaders prefer 
to avoid situations in which their treaty 
obligations might come in obvious con-
flict with their policies. It has also been 
noted that the more specific and clear 
the treaty obligation is, the less room 
there is for divergent interpretations-
the . less likely are the Soviets to violate 
it. Yet, the record of observance by the 
Soviets of their treaty obligations, par-
ticularly in matters of political im-
portance, has not been such as to inspire 
general confidence. Even allowing for 
reasonable differences in interpretation 
and for the uncertainty of the rules of 
international law concerning termina-
tion of treaties, the behavior of the 
Soviet Union has given the impression 
that its promises are not to be trusted. I 
have already referred to the nonaggres-
sion pacts which did not prevent the 
Soviets from invading or coercing cer-
tain of its neighbors. Certainly the 
failure to withdraw troops from Iran 
after the end of hostilities in World War 
II was a clear violation of a treaty 
obligation. The Soviets have failed t~ 
keep may promises not to support 
subversive activities abroad. The United 
States felt compelled to protest in 1935 
against the Soviet violation of such a 
promise less than two years after it had 
been given. Soviet behavior in Eastern 
and Central Europe after World War II 
has been generally regarded in the West 
as not in conformity with the agree-
ments at Yalta and Potsdam. Many 
other examples could be given. 
There is still another device which 
helps the Soviet Union to get around 
international law and which cannot be 
left out of any realistic account of 
Soviet behavior. This device is mis-
representation of the facts. This seems 
to be the standard device, for example, 
in justifying the Soviet role in border 
incidents. It is always the American or 
other foreign airplane that invades 
Soviet territory and starts shooting. And 
you may recall the Soviet version of 
how the conflict in Korea started in 
1950-it was the South Koreans who 
attacked first. This device is also fre-
quently used when the Soviets are 
charged with promoting subversion 
abroad. The facts are simply denied. 
So far, I have talked primarily of the 
use of international law in Soviet policy 
as a weapon in the struggle against the 
so-called capitalist encirclement. The 
picture is not encouraging. You will 
recall that Vyshinksy in his definition of 
international law mentioned coopera-
tion as well as struggle. The Soviet 
leaders recognize that a period of co-
existence with the capitalist encircle-
ment may last for some time to come. 
During this period of relatively peaceful 
relations it may be, and often has been, 
to the advantage of the Soviet State to 
eo operate with the capitalist states for 
various purposes. In fact, the building 
up of the economic and military power 
of the Soviet State, particularly in the 
early days, required commercial and 
other eeonomic relations with the out-
sidc world, and the avoidance of exces-
sive friction which might lead to open 
warfarc. Participation in international 
organizations of political, as well as 
technical, character has also been 
decmed neccssary in the interests of the 
Soviet State. Finally, on occasion the 
Soviet State found itself allied with 
some eapitalist states against common 
encmies, as was the case during World 
War II. International law has been recog-
nized by the Soviet leaders as a useful 
device for the facilitation of peaceful 
and cooperative relations with the out-
side world when Soviet policy calls for 
them. 
As a matter of fact, there has been a 
considerable measure of routine ob-
servance of international law by the 
Soviets. For example, aside from certain 
claims to territorial waters, about which 
I shall speak later, the Soviets have by 
and large respeeted the principle of the 
freedom of the seas. Despite occasional 
incidents involving foreign diplomatic 
personnel in Moscow, the Soviets have 
observed the generally recognized rules 
of diplomatic relations with most 
capitalist states. Before World War lIt 
thousands of foreign technicians worked 
in the Soviet Union, helping to develop 
Soviet industry. Again, with some ex-
ceptions, the Soviets treated these for-
eigners in accordance with recognized 
international standards. The Soviet 
record of observance of nonpolitical 
commitments-for example, commercial 
agreements and technical arrange-
ments-has been appreciably better than 
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their record with respect to political 
treaties, such as nonaggression pacts. 
During World War II, the Soviets gener-
ally honored their strictly military com-
mitments to their allies. All of this 
indicates that the Soviet Union is per-
fectly capable of observing international 
law when its leaders believe it to be in 
their interest. 
Yet, it must be noted that Soviet 
writers have on occasion stated that 
cooperation with the capitalist world is 
itself a form of struggle. 
At this point, I should like to men-
tion some distinctive factors other than 
Communist ideology that enter into the 
Soviet interpretation and application of 
international law. 
First, the nature of the Soviet politi-
cal and economic system. This system, 
to be sure, is in large part an outgrowth 
of Soviet ideology; but, once estab-
lished, it acquired a life of its own and 
its own needs which may persist even if 
the ideology is changed or no longer 
taken seriously. 
One of the features of the Soviet 
system is the totalitarian control of the 
population by the government. This 
control, for full effectiveness, requires a 
limitation on the contacts of the Soviet 
population with the outside world; it 
requires a monopoly of the information 
which is allowed to reach the people. 
This is an important source of the 
restrictions placed on the travel of 
Soviet citizens abroad and of foreigners 
in the Soviet Union, as well as such 
devices as the jamming of foreign broad-
casts. It also accounts in part for the 
refusal to recognize individuals as having 
rights in international law, and the 
reluctance of the Soviets to enter into 
any agreement whereby they would be 
required to permit free entry to foreign 
nationals or officials. It has possibly 
entered into the Soviet coolness toward 
disarmament control plans which in-
volve wide travel in the Soviet Union by 
foreign inspectors. The totalitarian con-
trols and the restrictions on contacts 
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with foreigners tend to distort even the 
information available to the leaders 
themselves; they prevent full under-
standing of the reactions to Soviet 
policies abroad; and they interfere with 
the development of any nonofficial con-
census between Soviet citizens and for-
eigners even on the professional level of 
international law. The complete govern-
mental control of all economic activity, 
particularly that involving foreign trade 
and shipping, means the absence of 
private economic interest groups which 
in the West have had a lot to do with 
the development and enforcement of 
certain international law standards and 
institutions. All of this tends to set the 
Soviets apart from the main stream of 
world thinking and feeling, and accentu-
ates the peculiarities of the Soviet ap-
proach to international law. 
The Soviet state monopoly of foreign 
trade and shipping has, indeed, direct 
effects on the Soviet interpretation of 
international law. Since all Soviet trade 
is conducted by government agencies, 
the Soviets steadfastly uphold the tradi-
tional principle that governments and 
their property are immune from the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts even when 
engaged in ordinary commercial activi-
ties abroad. This principle is being in-
creasingly questioned and modified in 
the non-Soviet world. The Soviets also 
insist that their trade representatives 
abroad are entitled to diplomatic im-
munities. As suggested by Professor 
Hazard, this may have other than a 
commercial objective, since immunity 
facilitates espionage and subversive 
activities; nevertheless, a number of 
European and other non-Soviet states 
have agreed to accord immunity to such 
representatives, since Soviet foreign 
trade is a state monopoly, and for-
eigners, if they want to do business with 
the Soviets, have no choice but to deal 
with official Soviet agencies. 
Another distinctive factor is the geo-
graphical position of the Soviet Union. 
Russia has always been primarily a land 
power. Its maritime power has been 
handicapped by the absence of good 
outlets on the open ocean and the fact 
that entrances to the seas bordering it 
are largely controlled by other nations. 
Naval power has more often figured in 
history as a means of attack on Russia 
rather than as an instrument of aggres-
sion on Russia's part. There are, further-
more, valuable fisheries off the coasts of 
Russia. All of this makes it natural for 
Russia to try to extend its territorial 
waters as far as possible through various 
devices, and to gain control of the 
entrances to the seas bordering it. A 
tendency to extend the Russian terri-
torial waters to twelve miles, instead of 
the three miles favored by the major 
maritime powers, appeared already 
before the Revolution, although it was 
manifested in the form of claims of 
jurisdiction for customs and fishery 
control rather than in terms of outright 
sovereignty. The Soviets inherited and 
strengthened this tendency. Although 
Soviet statutes do not seem flatly to 
assert Soviet sovereignty in a zone 
twelve miles wide-speaking rather in 
terms of control for security and other 
purposes-there can be little doubt that 
the Soviet Union does claim today a 
12-mile zone of territorial waters. In all 
fairness, it should be noted that this 
claim seems modest in comparison with 
the 200-mile claims recently made by 
some Latin American States. Never-
theless, it has been a cause of frequent 
controversies with other powers, in-
cluding the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and the Scandinavians. 
The Soviet Union maintains that each 
state may fix the width of its territorial 
waters in the light of all the attendant 
circumstances. 
A further example of the tendency 
to extend Soviet territorial waters may 
be seen in the statements of Soviet 
writers that four seas bordering the 
Soviet Union on the north-the Kara, 
Laptev, East Siberian and Chukot (or 
Chukchi)-are in reality territorial bays; 
that is, a part of Soviet inland waters, 
rather than high seas. There is a hint 
that the same principle may apply to 
thc Sea of Okhotsk. As yet, there seems 
to have bcen no occasion on which the 
Soviet government made such claims 
officially. The White Sea, however, is 
definitely treated as a part of Soviet 
inland waters. 
Another claim made by Soviet 
writers and apparently espoused by the 
government is that certain seas border-
ing Russia are closed seas, because they 
do not constitute waterways used for 
navigation other than that to and from 
the littoral states and, therefore, naviga-
tion on them is of concern only to the 
latter, which are entitled to regulate it 
in their own interests even to the point 
of forbidding access to outsiders. This 
concept of the closed seas, which should 
be distinguished from that of territorial 
waters, is novel in modern international 
law. The Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, 
as well as the landlocked Caspian Sea, 
are regarded by Soviet writers as closed 
seas. Recent reports indicate that the 
Soviet Union has proposed to Japan 
that the Sea of Japan should be declared 
a closed sea, on which navigation by 
warships of outside powers would not 
be allowcd. The Sea of Okhotsk, if not 
claimed by the Soviets as a territorial 
bay, might also be regarded as a closed 
area. 
As yet, the Soviet concept of the 
closed sea does not seem to have had 
much practical effect. Russia, however, 
has always been interested in the con-
trol of the Turkish Straits leading to the 
Black Sea. Although the Soviets are a 
party to the Montreux Convention of 
1936 on the Regime of the Turkish 
Straits, they have not been entirely 
satisfied with it, since it does not 
completely bar the Black Sea to the 
warships of outside powers and places 
some restrictions on the passage of 
warships of the Black Sea powers, en-
trusting Turkey with the enforcement 
of its provisions. The Soviet Union 
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would like to amend the convention to 
remove these objectionable features. It 
would also like to control the Straits 
itself. At present, three of the four 
Black Sea powers-the Soviet Union 
itself, Rumania and Bulgaria-belong to 
the Soviet block. Soviet proposals to 
give the control of the Straits and of the 
navigation of the Black Sea to the Black 
Sea powers would, therefore, give the 
Straits the preponderant influence. 
Another consequence of Russia's 
geographical position is her espousal of 
the so-called sector principle in the 
Arctic. This principle, invoked by the 
Russian government before the Revolu-
tion, would permit Russia to claim all 
the islands in the Arctic Ocean up to the 
North Pole, including those not yet 
discovered or possessed, within the 
limits of a sector-like a slice of a 
pie-defined by the meridians at the two 
opposite extremities of the Russian ter-
ritory bordering On the Arctic. Canada 
also favors the sector principle, although 
it has maintained it less bluntly. You 
can easily see why both Russia and 
Canada are in favor of it. Although the 
sector principle cannot be said to have 
obtained general recognition, the Soviet 
Union does in fact control virtually all 
of the islands claimed by it. Since there 
seems to be no additional land to be 
discovered, the sector principle has 
ceased to be much of an issue so far as 
lands in the Arctic are concerned. There 
has been a tentative suggestion in the 
Soviet literature, however, that the 
sector principle should be extended to 
cover not only land but water and the 
air space as well, making the Arctic 
Ocean all the way to the Pole a part of 
Soviet territory. Some Soviet writers 
have also claimed ice fields within the 
sector. There is no definite indication as 
yet that the Soviet government is pre-
paring to make such claims official. 
Although the Soviets favor the sector 
principle in the Arctic, Soviet writers 
deny that it applies in the Antarctic, 
citing the differences in the geographical 
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situation. The Soviet Union has made 
no formal claims to any territory in the 
Antarctic, but has insisted that Russian 
discoveries in that region in 1819-1821 
entitle it to a voice in any general 
settlement of the problem of the con· 
trol of the Antarctic, and has protested 
against the claims of some other states. 
Although the Soviet interest in the 
extension of territorial waters, the con-
cept of the closed seas, the sector 
principle in the Arctic, and related 
matters, is largely determined by the 
geographical position of Russia, and is a 
traditional Russian interest not related 
to Communist dogma, it is heightened 
by the Soviet ideology of hostility to 
the outside world and the needs of 
totalitarian controls. The Soviet posi-
tion on these matters is obviously re-
lated to the security of the Soviet State, 
living in a hostile environment, against 
any attack or interference from the 
outside. Should Soviet ideology be 
eliminated, it may be expected that any 
government of Russia will continue to 
favor the twelve-mile zone and the 
sector principle, but possibly with less 
vehemence. 
Under what conditions may we 
expect the Soviet Union to observe 
international law? And what of the 
future? 
Before attempting to suggest any 
answers to these questions, I should like 
to compare briefly the Soviet attitude 
toward international law ,vith the atti-
tudes in the non-Soviet world. This will 
give us a better perspective. 
Many aspects of the Soviet attitude 
find a counterpart in the non-Soviet 
world. Surely it would be ridiculous to 
assert that in the non-Soviet world 
international law is observed with per-
fect regularity; that treaties are always 
kept; that expediency never enters into 
the interpretation and application of 
international law; that international law 
is never used for propaganda purposes; 
or that facts are never misrepresented. 
Indeed, there is a strain in Western 
thought, going back at least to Machia· 
velli, which would make expediency 
the sole basis for the observance of 
international obligations. As you may 
recall, Machiavelli said that a prince 
should not honor his promises if it is to 
his disadvantage to do so. In more 
recent times, the same kind of attitude 
has given rise to the idea that raison 
d'etat, necessity or self-preservation-
often very broadly interpreted-justifies 
a state in doing anything. Furthermore, 
there is a school of thought in the West 
that advocates flexible interpretation 
and application of international law, 
pointing out that rules of law are not 
absolutes that have to be obeyed for 
their own sake; that they are means to 
some end, instruments of policy, and 
that they should be so interpreted and 
applied as best to achieve desirable 
results. In the absence of universal 
agreement on the values and goals to be 
served by the rules of law, this idea, 
meritorious though it may be in princi-
ple, often means that a decision-maker 
feels free to interpret international law 
flexibly to serve the purposes he hap-
pens to favor. There are also people who 
deny the reality of international law. 
Am I trying to say there is no 
difference between the Soviet and the 
non-Soviet attitudes toward interna-
tional law? Not at all; there are very 
important differences, but we should 
understand their nature and sources. 
First of all, in the non totalitarian 
West, side by side with the idea that the 
observance of law is a matter of ex-
pediency, there has always been another 
idea-that observance of the law is a 
moral obligation, that law and morality 
have objective validity, and that they lie 
at the very foundation of civilized 
existence. There is a tradition of respect 
for law that carries over into interna-
tional affairs. The overall Western atti-
tude toward international law is a com-
posite, a blend in varying proportions, 
of these two principles-the principle of 
expediency and the principle of moral 
obligation. Communist ideology, on the 
other hand, leaves no room for a feeling 
of moral obligation to observe the law 
when its observance is not expedient for 
the Soviet States. In fact, the very 
existence of objective and universally 
binding moral principles is denied. This 
difference is accentuated by the absence 
in most of the non-Soviet world of 
totalitarian controls and forced con-
formity to any single ideology. In the 
Soviet State, ideas contrary to those 
favored by the leaders cannot be pub-
licly expressed; on the surface, Commu-
nist ideology, the ideology of ex-
pediency in international relations, 
reigns supreme. 
Probably even more important is 
another difference. As I have previously 
indicated, Communist ideology means 
that the Soviet Union regards all of the 
non-Soviet states as basically its ene-
mies. Peaceful cooperation is bound to 
be temporary and for limited purposes 
only. It is expected that eventually 
Communism will prevail over all its 
enemies and so-called peaceful co-
existence will come to an end. It is this 
sense of basic hostility and the tem-
porary nature of any accommodation 
that distinguishes most profoundly the 
underlying Soviet attitude toward inter-
national relations, including interna-
tional law. Without it, incidentally, 
there would be less incentive for the 
Communists to reject universal, re-
ciprocally binding, moral principles. In 
the non-Soviet world, no such feeling of 
ineluctable and lasting hostility nor-
mally enters into relations between dif-
ferent states. In fact, most of the states 
of the world have an expectation of 
friendly and lasting coexistence with 
most of the other states. This is often 
true even when they go to war with 
each other-the war is regarded as a 
temporary condition which does not 
necessarily mean undying hostility be-
tween the two nations. In the relations 
between non-Soviet states, therefore, 
even though expediency be the under-
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lying principle, much greater value is apt 
to be put on reasonably faithful observ-
ance of international law as a condition 
of stability and orderly coexistence. The 
long-range value of good faith is apt to 
be better appreciated. 
Differences between the Soviet and 
the non-Soviet economic systems are 
another factor. They reduce still further 
the element of a community of interest 
as a foundation of international law. 
In the light of the foregoing, under 
what conditions can we expect the 
Soviets to observe international law? 
The obvious answer is that the 
Soviets will observe international law 
when it is to their advantage to do so. 
The question, then, is when is it to their 
advantage? I have already given some 
partial answers to this question. Im-
mediate advantages do flow to the 
Soviets from the observance of interna-
tional law on their part in a variety of 
situations. 
First of all, unless the Soviets are 
prepared to go to all-out war with the 
rest of the world, it is to their advantage 
to observe international law to the 
extent necessary to avoid excessive fric-
tion with other nations. Here is where 
the rules of territorial sovereignty, juris-
diction, freedom of the seas, treatment 
of aliens, and the like-as well as treaties 
dealing with these matters-come in. 
The Soviet Union normally does observe 
many of these rules. 
Second, reciprocity and retaliation 
play a part in the observance of interna-
tional law. To the extent that limited 
cooperation with non-Soviet countries is 
desired by the SovieLUnion, it is likely to 
observe reasonably well the rules govern-
ing such cooperation. There is no guaran-
tee, however, that a shift in Soviet policy 
may not at any time put an end to the 
Soviet interest in the observance of any 
of these rules. Fear of retaliation is 
another factor which may be expected to 
induce the Soviet Union to observe inter-
national law. This may be true, for 
instance, with regard to the laws of war. 
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Third, the Communist leaders are by 
no means unmindful of world public 
opinion-or of public opinion in the 
countries with which they want to deal. 
A striking confirmation of this fact can 
be seen in the recent agreement of the 
Bulgarian Communist government to pay 
damages for the shooting down of an 
Israeli airliner and to punish those re-
sponsible for it. Many observers have 
noted that the Soviets are less likely to 
violate a treaty if it is specific and 
unambiguous. This is another confirma-
tion of the value of public opinion. The 
Soviets try to avoid committing clear 
violations which would shock public 
opinion. 
These factors may be called the 
short-range advantages to the Soviets of 
the observance of international law. To 
the extent such factors work, interna-
tionallaw does make a difference, even 
though we cannot rely on the Soviets 
carrying out their obligations in good 
faith. The treatment of the prisoners 
taken by the Communists in Korea, bad 
as it was, might have been even worse if 
there had been no international stand-
ards at all. 
Communist ideology, as I have indi-
cated, minimizes the long-range value of 
the observance of international law, 
since Communists do not believe in 
lasting coexistence between the Soviet 
and the non-Soviet worlds. Yet, it is not 
inconceivable that this may change. If 
Soviet leaders become convinced that 
the so-called capitalist world is here to 
stay, they may come to appreciate the 
advantages of stability and good faith. 
Such an evolution may be helped along 
by greater contacts with the outside 
world. In short, Soviet leaders may 
come to redefine their interests. Com-
munist ideology will certainly har,nper 
such a reappraisal of the Soviet position 
in the world; but it may not prove to be 
an insuperable obstacle. The doctrine of 
the implacable hostility of the two 
worlds may be reinterpreted or quietly 
given up as an effective guide to policy. 
Perhaps it has already been given up in 
Yugoslavia by the Tito Communists. As 
Toynbee has pointed out, this has hap-
pened to the Moslem doctrine of the 
holy war against the infidels, which no 
longer stands in the way of peaceful 
relations between Moslem and Christian 
nations. Reinterpretation of ideology is 
not new in Communist history. 
Indeed, although I have stressed 
ideology as an important factor in 
Soviet policy, the precise role of Soviet 
ideology has long been a subject of 
controversy in the West. Some observers 
are inclined to believe that ideology is 
an instrument rather than a determinant 
of Soviet policy. I happen to believe 
that ideology has exerted a substantial 
influence on Soviet policy. But it may 
not be the decisive factor. When we deal 
with human emotions and motivations, 
we are pretty much in the dark. The 
personality factor should not be dis-
counted. Stalin ruled as a dictator for 
some twenty-five years, and Soviet 
policy could not but reflect his per-
sonality. We cannot tell as yet what 
influence ideology will have on the 
policies of the new generation of Soviet 
leaders now coming to power. Should 
the idea of lasting hostility between the 
two worlds be given up, fairly stahle 
relations under international law may be 
established even if the principle of 
expediency continues to prevail, pro· 
vided that the interests of the Soviet 
State are defined moderately and intelli· 
gently. 
If there is any hope at all that the 
Soviet leaders, present or future, may 
develop a more constructive attitude 
toward international law, what policies 
of the non-Soviet world are likely to 
assist in this process? 
First, the Soviets must be continually 
impressed with the strength and sta-
bility of the so·called capitalistic world. 
This means that we-i.e., the whole 
non-Soviet world, not just the United 
States-must not only remain strong 
militarily, but must have a rate of 
economic development and general 
progress at least equal to that of the 
Soviet bloc. At the same time, we must 
continue to make it plain that we are 
men of peace and that we are not 
opposed to genuine peaceful co-
existence with the Soviet bloc if the 
Soviet leaders make it possible. We 
should also try to break down the 
intellectual isolation of the Soviet coun-
tries by encouraging their contacts with 
the non-Soviet world. 
Second, our agreements with the 
Soviet Union and its allies should be so 
designed that it will be to their own 
continuous advantage to keep them. In-
deed, this is a good principle to be 
followed in all international negotiations. 
As Professor Briggs has well said, "the 
treaties most likely to be observed are 
those which recognize and develop with-
in a legal framework a positive mutuality 
of in terests." The making of such treaties 
obviously requires much wisdom and 
skill. It is also wise to make all agreements 
with the Soviets in writing, and as clear 
and specific as possible. 
Third, it should be our normal policy 
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to interpret international law fairly and 
to apply it in good faith. Indeed, if the 
non-Soviet nations should cease to take 
international law seriously and get into 
the habit of manipulating it for immedi-
ate advantage, why should the Soviets 
behave differently? Such behavior will 
merely confirm their belief that law is 
an instrument of policy cynically used 
by the capitalists for their own gain. 
The only way to teach the Soviet 
leaders the value of international law is 
for us to practice it. If, by way of 
exception and for our self-preservation, 
we are compelled to depart from law, 
we should make it clear that the be-
havior of our adversaries leaves us no 
choice. 
Fourth, we must react firmly and 
vigorously against all clear violations of 
international law to our detriment. In-
ternational law itself provides for 
measures of retaliation and reprisal-not 
necessarily armed reprisals-against its 
violations. We should use all suitable 
means to prove that violations of inter-
national law do not pay; and that good 
faith does pay. 
----'f1----
